Case Translation: Norway by Case Translation:, Norway
Succession law. Lost testament.
The probate court and the appellate court found that a
successor by testament should succeed according to a
lost testament according to Lov om arv m.m., LOV 1972-
03-03 nr 05 (short title: Arvelova) (succession act)
section 69.1 It was not clear how the testament had
been lost, but a number of electronic copies were stored
on a personal computer and also sent as an attachment
to an e-mail. Several circumstances supported the
proposition that the testament expressed the last will of
the deceased, and there was no doubt as to the
contents. The required forms were fulfilled when the
testament was made. Statement on the standards for
proof.
Oslo Town Clerk Office TOBYF-2005-120940 –
Borgarting Applleate Court LB-2006-27667. Appeal to
the Supreme Court denied HR-2007-1859-U.
The full judgment in Norwegian is available from
lovdata.no (subscribers only).
(Note by Professor Jon Bing: The decision is from the
Appellate Court. Norway has fiveAppellate Courts –
Borgaring is for the region near Oslo. The decisions are
classified in accordance with the provisions of the civil
procedure act, and this is a decision in substance. The
publication numbers refer to the assigned identifiers in
Lovdata, the national legal information service. The
keywords and abstract are editorial. The procedural
history indicates that the Supreme Court refused to hear
the case. The decision of the Supreme Court is not
available, but the Supreme Court will not hear cases
which mainly rest on evidence. The titles of the judges
may appear to be confusing, but the appeal was heard
with a mix of judges including judges of lower levels.)
D died on 24 February 2005 at Cs cottage in X. He had
known her in a period during the 1980s, and from 2000
a lover’s relationship had developed between them.
They moved to live together in 2003, though Ds
business in Oslo had the effect that they only lived
together for periods. They were engaged in 2004 and
intended to marry during Easter 2005. D left a
testament in favour of C, and in the event she died
before him, to the Salvation Army. The testament
included provisions on the accommodation and
contributions towards the support of his parents. The
testament also contains a passage indicating that his
sister E and her heirs should not benefit under any
circumstances.
D’s mother, B, owned a manor, Y farm in Z, and 16
apartments and office suites in two buildings in …street
in Oslo.
In 1991 B transferred Y farm to her daughter E, and in
2003 she transferred the flats and office suites in
…street to her son D. A conflict arose in the family,
because the daughter thought she was the subject of an
unfair share of the property, and that her mother had
been pressured to make the transfer. The mother denied
she was pressured, and the daughter replied by asking
to have her mother declared incapacitated. In the
decision by Oslo first instance court of 18 June 2004, the
request was not granted. The decision was appealed to
Borgarting appellate court, but the appeal was
withdrawn some weeks before the appellate
procedures, after her brother’s death.
From what has appeared during the proceedings, the
appellate court find that E’s protests relating to the
transfer of property to her brother, her action against
her mother, and the appeal of the decision of the first
instance court created difficult internal relations in the
family, where she and her spouse confronted the rest of
the family, as well as the parents. E may have disputed
during the appellate procedures that there were any
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1 ‘Kan eit testament ikkje finnast når testator er
død, skal det likevel gjelde når innhaldet kan
klårleggjast, med mindre ein må gå ut frå at
testamentet er kalla tilbake eller at det har vore
ugyldig.’ (‘If a testament cannot be found when
the testator has died, it shall nevertheless be valid,
unless there is reason to believe that is has been
revoked or has become invalid.’) (The translations
were provided for the Foreign Office. Note that the
Norwegian version is in ‘nynorsk’, the second
variation of the written language.)
134 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 5                               www.deaeslr.org © Pario Communications Limited, 2008
distinct conflicts within the family, but the witnesses in
the case and the content of the disputed testament
clearly shows that there was an irreconcilable conflict
between her and her brother. It does appear obvious
that the relation between the siblings became difficult
because of the conflict relating to the legal action taken
by the sister. D and his mother had a close and warm
relationship, and he must have, on her behalf as well as
his own, have felt somewhat frustrated when his sister
challenged the property transactions to have them
declared invalid by having his mother declared
incapacitated. The decision of the first instance court
did not satisfy her, because she appealed the decision,
and this must have contributed to maintain the level of
conflict.
The appeal court finds it appropriate to mention that
it is a matter of fact that the mother, during the first
period after the death of her son, had no objections to
his testament in favour of his mistress C. It also implies
that she does not contest the validity of the transfer of
the apartments and suites in …street to her son. That
she – and her spouse –initiated legal proceedings at a
later date relating to the testament and, in addition,
proceedings relating to the property transfers
themselves, is therefore an indication of a change of her
earlier opinion. That the daughter has gradually
improved her relation with her parents should be
considered when assessing the evidence in this respect.
The appellate court noted that the parents lost the
dispute with respect to the property transfers in the
Oslo first instance court, but the case has been
appealed.
In spite of an intense search, which only started some
days after the funeral, the original testament signed by
D has not been found. However, it is an accepted fact
that he had created a document calling itself a
testament in the presence of two witnesses. He also
sent this as an attachment to an e-mail dated 7
November 2003 to C. As the appellate court will return
to below, there is no doubt that the document sent to
her is a copy of the testament D created and signed on 7
November 2001. The e-mail is found on a backup list for
C’s personal computer which D established. The e-mail
itself reads: ‘I love you.’
In addition, several other copies of the document
were found in different places. For instance, three
different back-ups were found on a hard drive in D’s safe
in …street, and also on a hard drive in his safe deposit
box at his bank.
In the dispute regarding the estate, Oslo Probate
Court and Town Clerk Office reached the following
decision on12 December 2005:
1. The testament dated 7 November 2004 shall be the
basis for the distribution of the estate after D born
** 1955.
2. Within 2 (two) weeks after the announcement of
this decision B and A pay in solidum2 to C the
costs of the proceedings amounting to 106 425
(onehundredandsixthousandfourhundredandtwen
tyfive) kroner to which is added value added tax of
102 200 kroner and with 9 (nine) per cent annual
interest from due date to the date payment is
made.
B and A have submitted an appeal within time to
Borgarting second instance court and made the
following final claim:
1. A draft document not signed by D, dated 7
November 2003, shall not be qualified as
testament in the distribution of the estate after the
death of D.
2. C pays the costs to B and A regarding the Probate
Court and the appellate court with the addition of
interest according to the act on interest for
delayed payments section 3(1) from due date to
the date payment is made.
C has responded, and made the following final claim:
1. The decision by Oslo first instance court and Oslo
Probate Court are confirmed.
2. C is paid the costs of the appellate court in
addition to the interest for delayed payment
according to the law from due date to the date
payment is made.
The appellate proceedings were conducted 28 June
2007 in Oslo. The parties appealing the decision were
not present, but they were represented by the daughter
E, who was also a witness in the case. C was present
and made a statement. Each party was represented by
legal counsel. Six witnesses were heard.
B and A have argued during the appellate
proceedings in general:
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2 ‘In solidum’ means that the full amount can be
collected from either A or B, while they, in respect
to each other, are only liable for half the amount. If
one pays the full amount, then there will be a
secondary claim to the other for half this amount.
In solidum is therefore a security with respect to
the creditor.
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There is no testament to be found after the death of
D. No valid testament has been created, and if a
testament was created, the contents cannot be
determined. In any event one cannot exclude the
possibility that the testament has not been
withdrawn. The beneficiary of the testament has the
burden of proof.
The question of whether, at a certain moment in time,
there exists a valid testament is a matter of proof,
and the requirements are strict, cf Rt-1994-1256.3
There is no doubt there does not exist a copy of the
original testament, neither as a conventional copy,
confirmed or not confirmed, and no scanned copy. It
should therefore be clear that there is no basis for
determining that a valid testament has been created.
The instrument necessary to determine an act by the
testator to adopt the testament is lacking, and there
is no justification to consider the provisions of
section 69 of the succession act.
Only a draft of the testament has been presented in
the case, necessarily produced before it was signed,
and this draft cannot therefore indicate with any
degree of certainty what may have been signed.
A subsidiary argument submitted is that even if a
valid testament has been created, which has been
lost at a later stage, it is not possible to determine its
contents. Only the deceased saw the contents, and it
is not possible to establish what the deceased knew.
The task of the court is not to determine the contents
of the draft to the testament, but the testament itself.
Consequently succession cannot follow in
accordance with the provision of section 69 of the
succession act.
A further subsidiary argument submitted is that a
possible testament was withdrawn by the deceased.
The fact that neither the original testament, nor any
copies have been found, provides a presumption for
a withdrawal of the testament. There is reason to
presume that a testator would preserve the original
document, and scan or make some other copy of the
testament. Where none of these are found, the
testament must have been withdrawn, and according
to the current law the burden of proof rests with he
who claims heritage based on testament, cf Lødrup
Nordisk arverett page 280.4
C has, during the appellate proceedings in general,
argued:
The testament of 7 November 2003 should be the
basis for the distribution of the estate.
The succession act section 69 on lost wills is the
natural point of departure for the arguments of the
court. As the provision presumes that a valid
testament is created according to the rules of section
49 of the succession act,5 it is of little consequence
whether section 69 is applied when deciding whether
a valid testament has been created.
The text of the testament dated 7 November 2003
complies with the law, and two witnesses were
simultaneously present with testator, they saw him
sign, and signed themselves as witnesses to the
testament. There a valid testament was created in
accordance with the provisions of section 49 of the
succession act.
It is not appropriate to characterise, as does the
other party, the testament of 7 November 2003 as ‘a
draft’ to the testament. Electronic metadata shows
that the document has not been amended after 7
November 2003 at 12:04, and it is a printout of this
document that was signed later the same day.
Neither the original or a photocopy of the signed
paper version of the testament has been found. The
provision of section 69 of the succession act governs
this situation. The testament shall apply when the
content is determined. It is admitted that the criteria
for permitting this are strict, but in this case are the
conditions, based on a general assessment of the
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3 The original was lost. A photocopy was produced,
which was claimed to be a copy of the original.
This was not accepted.
4 The major Norwegian text book on succession law.
5 ‘Når ikkje anna er fastsett i dette kapitlet, skal
testament gjerast skriftleg med to vitner som
testator har godtatt og som er til stades saman og
veit at dokumentet skal vere testament. Testator
skal, medan dei er til stades, skrive under
dokumentet eller vedkjenne seg underskrifta. Vitna
skal skrive namna sine på dokumentet medan
testator er til stades og etter hans ønske.
Har vitna gitt testamentet påskrift om at reglane i
første ledd er følgde, er dette prov nok, når ikkje
særlege tilhøve gir grunn til å tvile på innhaldet i
påskrifta.
Loven er ikkje til hinder for at fleire personar gjer
felles testament. Heller ikkje er loven til hinder for
at fleire personar gjer testament til føremon for
kvarandre (gjensidig testament).’
(‘Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter, a
testament shall be drawn up in writing with two
witnesses who have been approved by the testator
and who are simultaneously present and know that
the document is a testament. The testator shall in
their presence sign the document or confirm his
signature. The witness shall sign their names on
the document while the testator is present and it
his wish.
If the witnesses declare in writing on the document
containing the testament that the rules of the
preceeding paragraph have been observed, such
declaration shall be deemed to be sufficient
evidence, unless special circumstances give reason
to doubt its correctness.
This Act does not prevent two or more persons
from drawing up a joint testament. Nor does the
Act prevent two or more persons from drawing up
a testament in favour of one another (reciprocal
testament)’).
136 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 5                               www.deaeslr.org © Pario Communications Limited, 2008
facts, are clearly satisfied.
After the deceased passed away, no other testaments
or documents relevant in this respect including
electronic media have been found, only the
document dated 7 November 2003.
Identical copies of the document of 7 November 2003
are found on several electronic storage media by the
deceased, such as special disks, stored in a safe and
a deposit box, and the testament was also attached
an e-mail to C sent on the same day at 16:57. D had
given this e-mail the description ‘TESTAMENT
F.E.dok.’6 The document was later communicated to
legal counsel Øystein Rød some two weeks before D
died. It is not realistic that he would have sent a copy
other than the correct one to his fiancé and the family
lawyer with the intent to mislead them.
The contents of the testament have a logic to them.
The deceased had a close relation with his fiancé and
partner C, and they were to be married in the near
future. It was also important for him to provide for
the financial security of his parents, something he
had discussed with his fiancé previously. At the same
time, the relation with his sister and her spouse was
bad, and became worse in the period after the
testament was executed and up to his death.
There is no reason to suggest that the testament had
been recalled.
The conditions that provide the motivation for the
testament, the love for his fiancé and the mistrust of
his sister, increased. He was to marry a few weeks
after his death, and there was no pretext or reason
for recalling the testament. If he wanted to recall the
testament, he would in any event have made sure to
do so in a way that was easily recognisable. He knew
it was stored electronically, and it is accepted that if
he intended to withdraw the testament, he would
have told his fiancé.
The appellate court finds:
The appellate court agrees with the decision of the
Probate Court, and can in general support its
arguments.
By the way of introduction, there is reason to
emphasise that the succession act was passed at a time
when electronic word processing, document storage, e-
mails etc did not exist. The terminology of the act, which
is strongly bound to paper documents containing the
instructions of a testator, and with the formal
requirements for the creation of a testament, apply
without any change. Therefore, succession by testament
can only be claimed on the basis of a formally valid
written document. This also holds if a testament is lost.
To succeed is necessary to prove – and the criteria for
proof are strict – that a valid testament has been
created and that the contents can be determined.
Obviously, the development in information technology
cannot be without relevance in relation to testaments
and succession by testament as proof in accordance
with the succession act section 69. However, one should
take into consideration the weaknesses of such proof,
and the possibility of any misinterpretations that may
occur. For instance, amendments in an electronic
document will delete what is amended in such a way
that the amended document presents itself as an
apparently uncorrected copy of the original. Where an
electronic testament is first created, it may be retrieved
even if the testator has recalled the testament, by both
the destruction of the original testament and deletion of
the electronic copies from their storage. Deleted
documents may be found and reconstructed using
relatively simple methods.
To ensure notoriety regarding the last will of the
testator, there is therefore reason to firmly apply the
strict rules of proof governing lost testaments in
accordance with the succession act section 69. The
provision is an application of the requirement that the
original document must be present, and therefore there
must be strict criteria as to the proof for the creation of
a valid testament that has not been recalled at a late
stage, and the content of the act. He who claims
succession by testament has the burden of proof.
In the appeal case, a discussion has taken place
between sections 49 and 69 of the succession act. The
appellant has, in this respect, argued that there exists a
condition for proceeding to the provisions of section 69
of the act, in that it is proved that at a certain time a
valid testament existed, that is a document created in
accordance with the formal procedure set out in section
49 of the succession act. In this respect, Rt-1994-1256 is
cited where it is stated that ‘the copy of the testament
as such did not represent clear or decisive proof for a
corresponding testament having been created’. Neither
the original nor a copy of the original document exists in
this case. The instrument, the ‘entrance key’ to section
69 of the act, which is proof of the last will of the
deceased, is missing. The respondent has argued that in
this case it is not relevant whether the question of
validity is governed by section 69 or directly by section
CASE TRANSLATION: NORWAY
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49.
Where a testament has been lost, it is a condition to
succeed that the testament was created in a valid
manner, that it has not been recalled, and that the
content can be determined, in accordance the
conditions set out in section 69 of the succession law.
The question as to whether these statutory conditions
are present relies on a concrete evaluation of the
evidence. The assessment of the evidence is free, and it
is not required that a copy of the original must be
available.
On the other hand, it is obvious that the lack of a copy
of a signed original is relevant for the judgement of
evidence that has to be made in accordance with the
provisions of section 59. That the original has not been
found makes it necessary to require strong standards of
proof to determine that the deceased had made a valid
and formally correct testamentary disposition of the
content as claimed. On the other hand, one must not
lose sight of the last will of the deceased, which ought
to be realised. If fully satisfactory proof can be given for
the deceased having created a valid testament, which
was recalled at a later date, and where there is no doubt
of its contents, his last will should be fulfilled.
According to the assessment of the appellate court,
there is no doubt that D created a valid testament. Both
witnesses to the testament explained themselves
during the appellate proceedings, and they have given
evidence that after having been asked by D to be
witnesses, they stayed together with him when he
signed the testament. They did not see the text itself,
which D either had folded over or hidden by another
paper, but they were told the document was a
testament, and they saw the title of the document
before they signed. They also saw the text above the
place they signed. The appellate court finds their
explanation credible, and the nuances in their
explanations are not more than must be expected by
witnesses giving independent explanations from
memory.
As mentioned above, no copy of the testament itself
has been presented. What exists are a number of
identical electronic stored copies. As with the Probate
Court, the appellate court finds according to a concrete
assessment of the evidence, identical to that of the
Probate Court, that the identical copies found after the
death of D are identical to the valid original testament
that is lost.
In the current case, it is not surprising that copies of
the original document could not be found. D worked
with information technology, and it was therefore
natural to him to use electronic document processing,
storage and communication, rather than conventional
copying.
It appears that the dating of the testament was
retained as document on the PC of D on 4 November
2003. The document was later opened, but not after 7
November 2003. The appellate court finds that D was
working with the text of the testament up to this time,
and the original copy was then printed out and signed in
the presence of the testamentary witnesses later the
same day. They have obviously not been able to indicate
the date they witnessed the testament, but there are no
indications that this was not 7 November 2003.
This is supported by the fact that the e-mail sent to E
was also sent on this date. The testament, dated the
same day, was attached to the e-mail. Admittedly, the e-
mail was found on a back-up of her Outlook established
by D, but this cannot be crucial. C has explained that
she clearly remembers receiving the e-mail, and that the
attachment was identical to the document present in
this case. She has also explained that she never
received or saw any other copy. The appellate court
finds the explanation of C credible.
The appellate court will further clearly exclude that D
would have communicated a document other than the
valid document created to his partner. There is
obviously the possibility that he communicated the
testament to her before it was signed the same day, and
that he subsequently amended the document before
sending it to her. The appellate court is certain that in
such a case, the corrected testament would have been
the one communicated to her afterwards. In addition, he
had a telephone conversation about the testament with
C the same day.
In addition, some 16 months later, a short time before
his death, D also communicated the same testament to
the family lawyer, Øystein Rød, in connection with the
case for incapacitation which the sister had initiated
against the mother. The testament is also found as
backup files stored on separate hard drives that D
stored in a safe and a depository box. In every place, the
document is dated 7 November 2003.There is no other
document with another date or different contents.
The testament also contained contents that appear
quite logical. When the testament was created, D and C
were established as lovers. It was a relationship that,
according to several witnesses, meant much to him.
According to one of the witnesses, he had gained a new
and better life than before. The relationship with C
CASE TRANSLATION: NORWAY
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developed further; they got engaged to be married and
decided a date for the wedding. His wish for her to
succeed him, she had had an infarction and suffered
from diabetes, appears well considered, reasonable and
clearly in correspondence with the impression the
witnesses in the case have given of the deceased. There
is no reason to doubt that the testament represent the
last will of D.
Also, the provisions in the testament on domicile and
support of the parents are in correspondence with the
good relationship D, according to witnesses, had with
his parents, especially his mother. What is written with
respect to the parents further supports the impression
of a well considered and reflected testament. He had
also discussed with C the implications for her if he
should die before her, and should his parents still be
alive. This was in practice the possibility he saw for
supporting his parents if he should die first. There
cannot be any doubt that he saw this as a good
solution. He trusted his partner fully, who had a good
relationship with his parents, and he trusted that they
would be safe.
The appellate court finds that D had a bad
relationship with his sister E and her spouse. The
situation become more acute with the reaction to her
mother’s transfer of apartments and suites in …street
some months before the testament was created. The
provision that the sister and her family should not
succeed him in any way is therefore also a conscious
decision.
This is further supported by what emerged through
the explanation of the witnesses during the appellate
proceedings of what D had said about the testament
and its contents. Though the testament witnesses was
not shown the text of the testament when it was signed,
D did not refrained from talking about the contents, and
there is no evidence which throws any measure of doubt
over him having created a valid testament with contents
that are identical to the electronic copies.
Neither are there any reasons to believe the
testament was recalled.
The fact that an original testament has not been
retrieved cannot in this case be decisive. There are
several possible explanations for losing a testament.
The appellate court can, first, not be sure that the
original testament exists among the papers he left.
Second, reference is made to the fact that the testament
relates to objects of great value that were contested,
and that there has been disclosed information
demonstrating a certain lack of order with respect to
securing the estate of D for days after his death.
However, there is little reason to discuss this further,
as there is a very solid and certain basis in evidence to
find that D only made one testament, and that this was
not recalled. He would undoubtedly have communicated
this to his fiancé, whom he was to marry in the near
future, if he had withdrawn the testament. Otherwise he
would have misled her, and their relationship would
seem to exclude this possibility. D would also obviously
have contacted the family lawyer if the testament he
had sent him was no longer valid. D was careful to store
the testament on several hard drives which were in turn
stored in safe locations, and he would obviously have
seen to the deletion of the testament if he recalled it
from these locations, or otherwise would have ensured
he clearly expressed his recall of the testament. For D,
who worked with information technology, the appellate
court considers it beyond belief that he would not have
left some electronic proof of a withdrawal. Obviously D
knew the testament could be found at several locations,
and if he wanted to withdraw the testament, he
obviously knew he could not let the testament remain
with those he has passed it to, or to remain at each of
the storage locations.
In addition, a further consideration is that the relation
between D and his sister and her spouse still was very
bad. He was angry that his sister initiated the incapacity
proceedings, and this cannot have been eased by the
sister, after losing the case in the first instance, by
appealing the decision. The appeal trial had been given
a date when he died. The conflict was not determined
before his death, and that he was in such a state of
mind that he would withdraw a testament in which a
major provision was to avoid his sister succeeding him
after the death of his parents, would seem beyond
thought.
In the light of this, the appellate court finds that C has
proved to such a degree as follows from the succession
act section 69 that D created a valid testament, which
has not been withdrawn, and that its contents are
documented.
The decision of the Probate Court is confirmed. This
also applies to the legal costs, to which the appellate
court has no comments.
The appeal has been in vain, and according to civil
procedure act sect 180(1), B and A are obliged in sodium
to pay the legal costs of the appellate court hearing. The
counsel for C has presented a statement for 96 875
kroner including value added tax, of which 77 500
kroner is the fee. The appellate court accepts the
statement, cf civil procedure act section 176.
The decision of the appellate court is unanimous.
CASE TRANSLATION: NORWAY
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Decision
1. The decision of the Probate Court is confirmed.
2.  B and A are to pay within 2 – two – weeks from the
announcement of this decision and in solidum to C
legal costs for the appellate court of 98 875 –
ninetysixeighthundredandseventyfive – crowns
with the addition of interest for delay according to
the delayed interest act until payment are made.
Sistoppdatert 25 April 2008
Commentary
Under Norwegian succession law, testaments are
exceptional. The issue of the deceased will succeed in
two thirds of the estate; this cannot be amended by
testament, upholding a tradition of a strong succession
right for the family going back to the earliest Norse
legislation. Also, the spouse of the deceased will
succeed in one quarter of the estate. What is left, may
be subject to testament, but is a possibility of which the
deceased rarely takes advantage. There are therefore
only few typical cases in which testaments are made,
the most common being that in which the testator does
not have any issue, as in this case.
If a testament is made, it has – as in most jurisdictions
- to adhere to a set of formalities. These include the
testament to be a paper document signed by two
witnesses present at the same time as the testator, each
person signing the document. The witnesses also have
to know that the document is the last will of the
testator, but do not have to know the content of this last
will. There are also a few further requirements.
There is, under Norwegian law, no scheme for
depositing testaments, although they are often left in
care with a lawyer. The typical situation will be that the
testament is part of the documents of the deceased,
stored with other important documents. Obviously there
is a risk of the testament not being found. For this, the
rules set out in section 69 of the succession act will
apply.
First, it has to be proven that a formally valid
testament has been created. As evidence is permitted
by the discretion of the court, this may be proven in any
way. In this case, the evidence is the oral evidence of
the witnesses to the testament. But it could be a note in
a diary, correspondence and such like. Both the
existence of the testament and compliance with the
formal requirement has to be proven.
Second, the contents of the testament must be
determined. It will be noted that the forms of the
testament would exclude any document relating to the
last will which is not formally correct. Therefore, when a
testament is lost, it is necessary to prove the contents in
some detail. It will typically be a copy of the testament,
for instance passed on to a friend for safekeeping.
Third, the testament must not be withdrawn. The
testament may be withdrawn at any time, and there are
no formalities for withdrawal, typically the testator will
just destroy the testament.
As the court remarked, the succession act was
adopted in 1972, at which time word processing was not
an issue. In case law, providing a copy of a testament
has not been accepted as sufficient evidence, the
reason for there only being a copy may be the
destruction and thereby the withdrawal of the
testament.
The importance of this decision is mainly in the
significance that the court places in the contextual
evidence for the computerised copies (1) to represent
the contents of the original testament, and (2) there
being no indication of withdrawal. The court determined
that a testament has been made in the traditional way,
based on the testimony of the witnesses. The court then
established the contents of the original testament with
reference to the computerised copies and the
circumstances in storing and communication the copies.
The same circumstances are used for establishing that
the original testament has not been withdrawn. 
It is interesting to observe that the court would seem
to have found the evidence strengthened by the obvious
possibility that the reason for the original not having
been identified is that it has been removed from the
documents of the deceased. Therefore the
circumstantial evidence of a technical nature would
seem in this decision to have been complimented by
knowledge of human nature.
© Translation and commentary, Professor Jon Bing, 2008
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